In 1983, in an open letter to the journal Nature, Karl Popper and David Miller set forth a particularly strong critical argument which sought to demonstrate the impossibility of inductive probability. Since its publication the argument has faced many criticisms and we argue in this article that they do not reach their objectives. We will first reconstruct the demonstration made by Popper and Miller in their initial article and then try to evaluate the main arguments against it. Although it is (...) possible to conceptualize logically the idea of induction, it is shown that it is not possible on traditional Bayesian grounds. (shrink)

In 1983, in an open letter to the journal Nature, Karl Popper and David Miller set forth a particularly strong critical argument which sought to demonstrate the impossibility of inductive probability. Since its publication the argument has faced many criticisms and we argue in this article that they do not reach their objectives. We will first reconstruct the demonstration made by Popper and Miller in their initial article and then try to evaluate the main arguments against it. Although it is (...) possible to conceptualize logically the idea of induction, it is shown that it is not possible on traditional Bayesian grounds. (shrink)

From the 1660s onwards, France tried to establish itself as a leading maritime and colonial power. The first French East India Company allowed a decisive penetration into the Indian Ocean, while the foundation of the Rochefort arsenal was the starting point of a great shipbuilding effort. The archives of the State Secretariat of the French Navy, ports, and learned societies, as well as printed scholarly literature, testify to an increasing mobilisation around the health of the “gens de mer.” Most (...) of the actors involved in this reflection, whether doctors or surgeons, naval officers or engineers, scholars or inventors, agreed in associating seamen's diseases with the poor air quality prevailing within ships. The environment of seafarers was thus definitely regarded as harmful. However, the atmosphere of a ship was also seen through the possibility to reshape it and reduce its dangerousness, with adapted behaviours, careful maintenance, or technical solutions. This was crucial to ensure the circulation of human beings and goods across the French overseas empire, but also to defend it from the threats associated with the major conflicts of the second half of the 18th century. This article highlights how environments regarded as “pathogenic” were conceived and reshaped during the second half of the early modern period in France, using the example of naval hygiene. It examines the strategies designed and implemented to combat the “noxious” air of French ships, in particular through the regulations introduced since the end of the 17th century, and considers how this issue has stimulated the search for technological solutions. (shrink)

In this paper I compare parametric and nonparametric regression models with the help of a simulated data set. Doing so, I have two main objectives. The first one is to differentiate five concepts of simplicity and assess their respective importance. The second one is to show that the scope of the existing philosophical literature on simplicity and model selection is too narrow because it does not take the nonparametric approach into account, S112–S123, 2002; Forster and Sober in The British Journal (...) for the Philosophy of Science 45, 1–35, 1994; Forster, 2001, in Philosophy of Science 74, 588–600, 2007; Hitchcock and Sober in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55, 1–34, 2004; Mikkelson in Philosophy of Science 73, 440–447, 2006; Baker 2013). More precisely, I point out that a measure of simplicity in terms of the number of adjustable parameters is inadequate to characterise nonparametric models and to compare them with parametric models. This allows me to weed out false claims about what makes a model simpler than another. Furthermore, I show that the importance of simplicity in model selection cannot be captured by the notion of parametric simplicity. ‘Simplicity’ is an umbrella term. While parametric simplicity can be ignored, there are other notions of simplicity that need to be taken into consideration when we choose a model. Such notions are not discussed in the previously mentioned literature. The latter therefore portrays an incomplete picture of why simplicity matters when we choose a model. Overall I support a pluralist view according to which we cannot give a general and interesting justification for the importance of simplicity in science. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to show how the problem of inflated effect sizes corrupts the severity measure of evidence. This has never been done. In fact, the Winner’s Curse is barely mentioned in the philosophical literature. Since the severity score is the predominant measure of evidence for frequentist tests in the philosophical literature, it is important to underscore its flaws. It is also crucial to bring the philosophical literature up to speed with the limits of classical testing. The (...) Winner’s Curse is one of them. The problem is that when a significant result is obtained by using an underpowered test, the severity score becomes particularly high for large discrepancies from the null-hypothesis. This means that such discrepancies are very well supported by the evidence according to that measure. However, it is now well documented that significant tests with low power display inflated effect sizes. They systematically show departures from the null hypothesis H0 that are much greater than they really are. From an epistemological point of view this means that a significant result produced by an underpowered test does not provide evidence for large discrepancies from H0. Therefore, the severity score is an inadequate measure of evidence. Given that we are now aware of the phenomenon of inflated effect sizes, it would be irresponsible to rely on the severity score to measure the strength of the evidence against the null. Instead, one must take appropriate measures to try and avoid using underpowered tests by setting a threshold for the sample size or by replicating the results of the experiment. (shrink)

It has been claimed that if statistical power and p-values are both used to measure the strength of our evidence for the null-hypothesis when the results of our tests are not significant, then they can also be used to derive inconsistent epistemic judgements as we compare two different experiments. Those problematic derivations are known as power approach paradoxes. The consensus is that we can avoid them if we abandon the idea that statistical power can measure the strength of our evidence. (...) In this paper however, I put forward a different solution. I argue that every power approach paradox rests on an equivocation on "strong evidence". The main idea is that we need to make a careful distinction between the evidence provided by the quality of the test and the evidence provided by the outcome of the test. Both provide different types of evidence and their respective strength are to be evaluated differently. (shrink)

The p value is the probability under the null hypothesis of obtaining an experimental result that is at least as extreme as the one that we have actually obtained. That probability plays a crucial role in frequentist statistical inferences. But if we take the word ‘extreme’ to mean ‘improbable’, then we can show that this type of inference can be very problematic. In this paper, I argue that it is a mistake to make such an interpretation. Under minimal assumptions about (...) the alternative hypothesis, I explain why ‘extreme’ means ‘outside the most precise predicted range of experimental outcomes for a given upper bound probability of error’. Doing so, I rebut recent formulations of recurrent criticisms against the frequentist approach in statistics and underscore the importance of random variables. (shrink)

In this paper I articulate a fictionalist solution to the closure problem that affects constructive empiricism. Relying on Stephen Yablo’s recent study of closure puzzles, I show how we can partition the content of a theory in terms of its truthmakers and claim that a constructive empiricist can believe that all the observable conditions that are necessary to make a part of her theory true obtain and remain agnostic about whether or not the other truthmakers for the other parts of (...) her theory obtain. This can be done even though she asserts her theory as if it was wholly true. (shrink)

In this paper, I compare theory-laden perceptions with imputed data sets. The similarities between the two allow me to show how the phenomenon of theory-ladenness can manifest itself in statistical analyses. More importantly, elucidating the differences between them will allow me to broaden the focus of the existing literature on theory-ladenness and to introduce some much-needed nuances.

The main point of this paper is to underscore that tests with very low power will be significant only if the observations are deviant under both H0 and H1. Therefore, the results of those significant tests will generate misleadingly high severity scores for differences between H0 and H1 that are excessively overestimated. In other words, that measure of evidence is bound to fail in those cases. It will inevitably fail to adequately measure the strength of the evidence provided by tests (...) with low power. (shrink)

The main point of this paper is to underscore the link between simplicity and truth in an unsupervised machine learning context. More precisely, we argue that parametric and dimensional simplicity are not indicators of truth but the methodological principle that urges us to pay attention to such notions of simplicity is truth conducive. The truth that we are looking for are specific geometrical shapes and we know which algorithm can find which shapes provided that we pay attention to parametric and (...) dimensional simplicity. (shrink)

The curse of dimensionality is one of the most prominent challenge that data scientists face when trying to make valuable inferences. It is an epistemic problem that hits particularly hard in "Big Data" research contexts, where the volume of the data set is particularly large. The way in which we tackle with this problem sheds light on the notion of scientific evidence. Yet, it is virtually absent from the current philosophical literature. In this paper, I aim to broaden the focus (...) of that literature by showing that the dimensions in which the data are embedded are an integral part of scientific evidence. This is an aspect of scientific evidence that is often hidden behind the traditional observation/theory dichotomy that we often encounter in philosophy of science. Dimensions are abstract objects. They are not observables like tables and chairs, nor are they entries in a data set. Ultimately, I aim to show that empirical adequacy is not merely a matter of finding the model that best fit the relevant observational data. It is also a matter of finding the model that best fit the relevant observational data inside the relevant dimensions. (shrink)

Machine learning is a scientific discipline that can be divided into two main branches: supervised machine learning and unsupervised machine learning. In this paper, we aim to show just how simplicity matters in unsupervised contexts. This is important because unsupervised machine learning algorithms have barely received any attention in philosophy. Yet, there is a direct link between simplicity and truth in unsupervised contexts that we do not find in their supervised counterparts. This has thus far evaded philosophical discussions on simplicity.

Classical statistical inferences have been criticised for various reasons. To assess the soundness of such criticisms is a very important task because they are widely used in everyday scientific research. This is one of the reasons why the philosophy of statistics is an exciting field of study. In this paper, I focus on two such criticisms. The first one claims that the use of the p-value violates the principle of total evidence. It is a thesis that has been defended by (...) Elliott Sober and Bengt Autzen. The second one says that the result of classical tests does not only depend on the data but on the sampling plan of the experimenter also. The underlying criticism of course is that the sampling plan is not part of the evidence and that classical tests therefore violate PTE. The intentions of the experimenter should not affect the result of an inference. My aim is to show that both criticisms are unsound. Doing so, I hope to clarify the concept of p-value and the nature of the evidence in classical statistical tests. The point of my paper is to show that the identification of the evidence on which those criticisms rest is inadequate. (shrink)

A l'automne de 1534, alors que le débat religieux en France est dominé par l'interférence des doctrines luthériennes et sacramentaires, et soudainement dramatisé par l'" affaire des Placards ", Guillaume Budé - tout en jetant sur son temps un regard lucide et souvent prophétique - écrit le livre qui couronne une quête spirituelle de plus de vingt années, justifiant ainsi (au sens théologique du terme) sa propre vie intellectuelle et l'humanisme dont il est le champion. Ce " livre-testament ", (...) tout vibrant d'une éloquence tendue, somptueuse et savante, opère dans sa complexe écriture le transfert de toutes les ressources des lettres profanes (dont le mot hellénisme est l'indice) au christianisme. Alchimie de la culture, alchimie du verbe. (shrink)

Journal Name: Philologus Issue: Ahead of print.

SummaryThis article aims to show how the translators of the Latin series of the “Collection des Universités de France” treated the obscene passages between 1920 and 1945. Some address the issue in their preface; many deliberately avoid a literal translation, either by quite simply refraining from translating the passages concerned, or by relying on a form of euphemisation. Each of these two strategies itself drew on various mechanisms. In the end, the “Collection des Universités de France” is shown to be (...) more precise than older or contemporary bilingual collections, whether in France or in the English-speaking world. Nontheless, from the 1930 s onward Jules Marouzeau criticised the translators for their prudery; progressively, the new translators became more explicit. (shrink)

Face aux enjeux de notre temps, nous semblons à bout de souffle : nous ne savons plus définir ce qui nous est commun et permettrait de relever les défis qui se présentent à nous. Désemparés, nous oublions la fraternité, notion évangélique et républicaine, qui nous permet de vivre ensemble. Pour raviver cette fraternité qui se dérobe à nos yeux, la seule solution est de refonder une foi commune, non pas confessionnelle, mais un élan de vie partagé qui nous porte et (...) nous rassemble. Dans cet essai inattendu et vivifiant, Guillaume de Tanoüarn ausculte en philosophe la crise de notre société. Convoquant Mandeville et Adam Smith, Diderot et Rousseau, Augustin et Kant, il relit la modernité sans la condamner et s'interroge sur les moyens de renouer avec une fraternité vivante. Car il est urgent et salutaire d'en redécouvrir le sens pour retrouver ce qui nous unit. (shrink)

Un navire humain fait naufrage sur l'ile du roi des djinns ou l'entente regne entre toutes les especes. Les naufrages pretendent qu'ils sont les seigneurs, que les animaux sont leurs serviteurs. S'engage alors un proces dans lequel les representants des nations humaines se succedent pour prouver leur superiorite. Les familles animales se relaient pour les refuter. Telle est l'epitre sur les animaux des Freres en Purete. Une fable-fleuve, un joyau inespere de la litterature arabe intercale entre un traite de botanique (...) et un traite d'anatomie. Tout a la fois divertissement et oeuvre de mobilisation politique, miroir tendu au prince aussi bien qu'aux peuples, hymne de louange au Createur, dispute theologique autour du privilege de l'homme dans la Creation, allegorie du systeme philosophique des Freres en Purete, le Proces animal de la domination humaine, qui connut un grand retentissement depuis les Mille et une nuits jusqu'a la Ferme des animaux d'Orwell, n'a pas fini de nous donner a penser et a debattre. Pour restituer l'oeuvre dans sa forme authentique et en offrir les clefs de lecture, il aura fallu se confronter a des manuscrits aux versions contradictoires, realiser l'enquete historique replacant le texte dans son contexte, et operer l'interpretation philosophique de la fable. Car cette epopee judiciaire est aux Freres en Purete ce qu'est la Caverne pour Platon, a savoir l'allegorie du systeme. (shrink)

RésuméAvant celle de Ṯābit b. Qurra, l’Introduction arithmétique de Nicomaque de Gérase fit l'objet d'une première traduction fautive révisée par un élève d'al-Kindī. Grâce à la partie éditée et traduite par Freudenthal et Lévy, nous pouvons désormais identifier ce réviseur comme étant Aḥmad b. al-Ṭayyib al-Saraḫsī, que nous avons par ailleurs reconnu comme auteur des Rasā᾿il Iḫwān al-Ṣafā᾿. La comparaison des gloses de ce réviseur d'une part avec un fragment inédit d'al-Saraḫsī et d'autre part avec les « Épîtres des Frères (...) en Pureté » corrobore l'attribution des épîtres à al-Saraḫsī. En outre, l’étude des contresens de cette version kindisée du texte de Nicomaque nous renseigne mieux tant sur la tentative kindienne d'unifier la philosophie que sur la spécificité de l'ontologie des Frères en Pureté. (shrink)

This article aims at presenting for the first time a central concept in al-Fbs work that constitutes a keystone in understanding his thought, be it in its logical or political aspects. This concept is that of naqla, which, in terms of transmission and translation, its generic transcription can be rendered as. The naqla is a notion that pertains to rupture in linguistic, logical or temporal continuities, and hints at confusing contiguities in the use of words, in demonstrations and in historical (...) processes. This notion of naqla is at the centre of the preoccupations of al-Fbrrābian sense; namely as a concept that entirely renews the question of transmission and translation. (shrink)

The remarks presented here are an attempt to elaborate a global approach, in a purely formal way, to professional ethics as a philosophical problem. Following a brief analysis of the link between practice and reflection , I form a general view of the ethical dimension of existence , then analyze some characteristics of modern professional activity and conclude by stressing the necessity for giving shape — especially through institutions — to this ethical movement .In this way, my remarks are an (...) attempt to respond to the conviction that the current interest in ethical matters within the professional domain signals a significant moment in our cultural and social history. Professional practice has never had a greater impact or greater autonomy than it has today. This raises the question whether they will join the human adventure in a responsible manner, or follow their own path, one guided by the demands of technical performance, economic profitability and unbridled globalization. In its ambiguity, the ethical summons that we hear from all sides today is perhaps the sign of a kairos, an occasion requiring both lucidity and commitment.Bearing this in mind, the question with which I would like to begin my remarks is the following: how should we seize this occasion and lead it toward the future? To be more precise: what are the conditions under which professional ethics can become, not simply a pronouncement, a dream, a desire or a regret, but a dynamic of social and historical responsibility? (shrink)

This book, which is one of the results of the "Core Materials Project" of the "European Ethics Network," submits for discussion the first results of an ...

Bergson définit le temps par la succession, qui est création de nouveauté. Mais il prend des exemples qui relèvent non de la succession mais de la simultanéité, garante d’une autre différence, entre deux choses qui coexistent en même temps, c’est-à-dire l’individualité. Dans Le Rire, on trouve en outre un type de comique qui joue sur la duplication simultanée du même. Ces cas de comique engagent la différence entre la simultanéité naturelle d’individus différents et la simultanéité artificielle d’êtres identiques. Si la (...) simultanéité mécanique du même fait rire, c’est bien que la simultanéité naturelle fonde les différences. Cet oubli de Bergson est d’autant plus surprenant que sa conception du temps repose sur une critique de celle de Kant, lequel avait précisément inclus la simultanéité dans le temps comme un de ses modes ; garant du « divers simultané ». Finalement, Bergson est contraint par sa controverse avec Einstein à réintégrer la simultanéité dans le temps. (shrink)

Ce livre présente une lecture globale du corpus kantien sous un angle particulier : comment "penser" le mal? Comme simple absence du bien? Comme erreur? Ou, ainsi que Kant l'a mis en évidence, comme une "grandeur négative", qui appartient à...